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Kinard: Use of Force to Recapture Chattels in South Carolina

LAW NOTE
USE OF FORCE TO RECAPTURE CHATTELS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
This discussion is limited to the liability of a party for the forceful recapture of chattels in South Carolina in reliance upon the default of a conditional sales agreement.
It has been uniformly held in this state that upon default by a
vendee to a conditional sales agreement, legal title to the chattel
vests in the vendor. 1 The right of seizure then arises in the vendor
as a license coupled with an interest which cannot be revoked by
the purchaser as it arises by operation of law as a part of the consideration of the sales agreement, and which carries with it the right
by implication to resort to whatever means are reasonably necessary
to effect a seizure of the property,2 including a peaceable entry upon
the premises of the vendee. 3 However, in attempting this seizure
the vendor must stay his hand short of committing a breach of the
peace and resort to the law for his relief by the institution of a
claim and delivery action against the buyer or assume the liability
therefor,4 for the continued preservation of the public peace is of
more importance than the right of an individual to gain possession
of his property.5
By "peace" as used by the courts in this connection it is meant
the tranquility which is enjoyed by the citizens of a community
where good order reigns among its members, which is the right of
6
all persons who are privileged to be living in a political society.
Exactly what constitutes a breach of the peace is, in South Carolina, a question for the jury, and it is reversible error if the trial
judge fails to submit this question to the jury for their considera7
tion.
1. Childers v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1938);
Harris v. Marco, 16 S.C. 575 (1881); Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E.
410 (1909) ; Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1932) ; Soulios v.
Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E. 2d 869 (1941); Rucker v. Smoke,
37 S.C. 377, 16 S.E. 40 (1891); Williams v. Tolbert, 76 S.C. 211, 56 S.E. 908
(1906) ; Lee v. National Furniture Stores, 163 S.C. 204, 161 S.E. 450 (1931);
Hamilton v. Blanton, 107 S.C. 142, 92 S.E. 275 (1916).
2. See note 1 supra.
3. Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1909); Childers v. Judson
Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1938).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. Soulious v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E. 2d 869 (1941);
Harris v. Marco, 16 S.C. 575 (1881).
6. Childers v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1938);
Webster's New International Dictionary (2d Ed. 1950) ; e. g., State v. Brooks,
146 La. 325, 83 So. 637, 639 (1919).
7. Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1932).
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However, our courts, in an effort to guide the jury in its decision
have defined a "breach of the peace" as an unwarranted disturbance
of the tranquility, and public order enjoyed by the citizens of a community.8 It does not seem necessary that the breach of the peace
actually be accompanied by some act of violence in order to lay the
foundation for this offense.9 An act, committed without right,
through the manifestation of force, and thereby inciting violence,
seems sufficient to create liability.' 0 In Lark v. Coope'r Furniture
Company,11 the plaintiff's tenant, whose rent was in arrears, abandoned the premises and left furniture which had been purchased
from the defendant under a conditional sales agreement, and on
which an unpaid balance remained. It appears that the defendant
through the manifestation of force and over the repeated verbal protest of the plaintiff entered upon the plaintiff's premises and proceeded to remove the furniture. Although no actual violence was
involved, the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court and affirmed
a Magistrate's judgment against the defendant for the commission
of an unlawful entry.
/
An entry upon the general premises of the vendee is not considered
a breach of the peace merely because the vendee raises a verbal objection to the entry. 12 For instance, in the case of Willis v. Whittle18
the agent of the defendant, over the verbal objection of the plaintiff's mother but in an orderly manner and without any manifestation of force, entered the plaintiff's stable and removed therefrom a
horse upon which the defendant held a chattel mortgage as security
for a sum of money owed him by the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's innocence of having provoked
a breach of the peace. However, such entry must be under right
and in an orderly manner under penalty of exposing the intruding
party to liability for trespass. 14 The dwelling house of the vendee
presents a different situation. It is concluded from the cases that
8. Childers v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1938);
Lyda v. Cooper, supra note 7; Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355,
17 S.E. 2d 869 (1941) ; Annot., 48 A.L.R. 85 (1927).
9. Miles v. Oklahoma, 236 Pac. 57, 44 A.L.R. 129 (1925); e. g., State v.
Brooks, 146 La. 325, 83 So. 637, 639- (1919); Childers v. Judson Mills Store
Co., supra note 8.
10. Lark v. Cooper Furniture Co., 114 S.C. 37, 102 S.. 786 (1919) ; Childers
v. Judson Mills Store Co., supra note 8; e. g., State v. Brooks, 146 La. 325,
83 So. 637, 639 (1919).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E. 2d 869 (1941);
Willis v. Whittle, 82 S.C. 500, 64 S.E. 410 (1919).
13. See note 12 supra.
14. See note 12 supra.
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a man's home is his castle and if an outsider intrudes therein in the
absence of the occupants and without their consent, he thereby be15
comes a trespasser.
CONVZRSION

It is the well settled law of this state that upon any breach by the
vendee to a conditional sales agreement, title and the right to possession of the property reunite in the vendor.' 6 Even where the
seller commits a breach of the peace by attempting an illegal seizure
upon the vendee's premises through the manifestation of force, he
7
only assumes thereby liability for an action in trespass.'
The only time in such a case that the vendor becomes liable for
conversion is where he effects a seizure prior to any breach on the
part of the vendee. 18
In South Carolina if the buyer of property upon a conditional
sales agreement defaults in his payments, he thereby places in the
seller the power to repossess the property if he can do so peaceably
and without provoking a breach of the peace. But if the buyer
objects and protests against the seller's recapture, and obstructs him
in so doing, it is not only the right of the seller but more important
his duty, to resort to legal process in order that he may peaceably
enforce his right to repossession. He is not entitled to use force
and may be found guilty of assault and battery or trespass, as the
case may be, if he does so.
It may be noted in conclusion that the rule as followed by our
South Carolina Supreme Court is in accord with the general rule as
followed by the great weight of authority throughout this country. 19
T. B.

KINARD.

15. Lark v. Cooper Furniture Co., 114 S.C. 37, 102 S.E. 786 (1919) ; Lee v.
National Furniture Stores Inc., 163 S.C. 204, 161 S.E. 450 (1931); Lyda v.
Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1932); Childers v. Judson Mills Store
Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1938) ; Annot., 48 A.L.R. 85 (1927).
16. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cook, 165 S.C. 387, 164 S.E. 17 (1932).
17. Young v. Corbitt Motor Truck Co., 148 S.C. 511, 146 S.E. 534 (1928).
18. Commercial Credit Co. v. Cook, 165 S.C. 387, 164 S.E. 17 (1932);
Young v. Corbitt Motor Truck Co., supra note 17; Lee v. National Furniture
Stores Inc., 163 S.C. 204, 161 S.E. 450 (1931).
19. Galloway v. General Motor's Acceptance Corporation, 106 F. 2d 469,
(1939) ; Shepard S. C. Co. v. United States, 111 F. 2d 110 (1940) ; Plate v.
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 98 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. S.C. 1951);
Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E.
63 (1933); Orr v. Russel, 231 S.W. 274 (1921); Sanders v. Washington
Fidelity National Insurance Co., 99 S.W. 2d 120 (1936); Bear v. Colonial
Finance Co., 42 Ohio App. 482, 182 N.E. 523 (1932); Keesecker v. General
Motor's McMelvey Co., 141 Ohio St. 162, 47 N.E. 2d 214 (1943); Westerman
v. Oregon Automobile Credit Corporation, 122 P. 2d 440 (1942); Annot., 57
A.L.R. 27 (1928); Annot., 105 A.L.R. 928 (1936).
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